Abstract. In cryptographic protocols it is often necessary to verify/ certify the "tools" in use. This work demonstrates certain subtleties in treating a family of trapdoor permutations in this context, noting the necessity to "check" certain properties of these functions. T h e particular case we illustrate is that of non-interactive zero-knowledge. We point out that the elegant recent protocol of Feige, Lapidot and Shamir for proving N P statements in non-interactive zero-knowledge requires an additional certification of the underlying trapdoor permutation, and suggest a certification method to fill this gap.
Introduction
Primitives such as the RSA function, the discrete log function, or, more generally, any trapdoor or one-way function, have applications over and above the "direct" ones to public-key cryptography. Namely, they are also (widely) used as "tools" in the construction of (often complex) cryptographic protocols. T h i s paper points to the fact that in this second kind of application, some care must be exercised in the manner in which the "tool" is used. Checks might be necessary that are not necessary in public-key applications.
The need for such checks arises from the need to consider adverserial behavior of parties in a cryptographic protocol. Typically, the problem is that one cannot trust a party to "correctly" create the tool in question. For example, suppose a party A is supposed to give another party B a modulus N product of two primes, and an RSA exponent e, to specify an RS.4 function. On receipt of a number N and an exponent e , it might be important that the receiver know that e is indeed an RSA exponent (i.e. relatively prime to the Euler Phi Function of N ) . This is because the use of RSA in the protocol might be such that making e not an RSA exponent could give A an advantage (such applications do exist). Such a problem is not present in public-key applications, where, if I wish, for example, to construct a digital signature scheme based on RSA, I put in my public file a modulus N (which I have chosen to be the product of two primes) and an RSA exponent e (and I keep secret the primes). T h e question of my choosing e to not be an RSA exponent does not arise because it is not to my advantage to do so.
Protocols address this issue in several ways. Often, they incorporate additional sub-protocols which "certify" that the "tool" used is indeed "correct." In applications, these sub-protocols usually need to be zero-knowledge ones. In most applications, such sub-protocols may be simply realized, by using, say, the result of [GMW] . But we note that this is not always the case. For example (cf. [BMO]), if we are trying to construct statistical ZK proofs, then we cannot use [GMW] to certify the tools because the latter yields only computational ZK.
The issue must then be settled by other means.
Sometimes, we note, the issue does not arise; this is the case, for example, if the tool is a one-way function, because a one-way function is a single object, a map from {0,1}* to (0, l}*, specified by a string known t o everyone. At other times, stronger assumptions about the primitive might be made. An example of this is the use, in protocols, of the "certified discrete log assumption" (as opposed to the usual "discrete log assumption").
The particular instance of this issue that we focus on in this paper is the use of trapdoor permutations in non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs. We point out that the elegant recent NIZK protocol of Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS] makes the (implicit) assumption that the trapdoor permutation is "certified." We note that this assumption is not valid for standard (conjectured) trapdoor permutations like RSA or those of [BBS] (and so their protocol cannot be instantiated with any known (conjectured) trapdoor permutation). We suggest a certification method to fill this gap (so that any trapdoor permutation truly suffices, and RSA or the construction of [BBS] may be used). Our certification method involves a NIZK proof that a function is "almost" a permutation, and might be of independent interest.
Below we begin by recalling the notions of trapdoor permutations and NIZK proofs. We then discuss the FLS protocol and indicate the source of the problem. We then, briefly, discuss our solution. Later sections specify the definitions and our solution in more detail.
Trapdoor Permutations
Let US begin by recalling, in some detail, the definition of a trapdoor permutation generator (cf. [BeMi]) , and seeing what it means for such a generator to be certified.
A trapdoor p e n n u t a t i o n generator is a triplet of polynomial time algorithms (G, E , I ) called the generating, evaluating, and inverting algorithms, respectively. The generating algorithm is probabilistic, and on input 1" outputs a pair of n-bit strings (f*, p ) , describing, respectively, a trapdoor permutation and its inverse. If Z, y are n-bit strings, then so are E(f* , z) and I ( f , y). Moreover, the maps f , f: {0,1}" + {0,1}" specified by f ( z ) = E(f*, z) and y(y) = I(f; , Y)
are permutations of (0, l}", and f = f-'. Finally, f is "hard to invert" without knowledge of f. (We refer the reader to $2.2 for more precise definitions).
Fix a trapdoor permutation generator (G, E , I ) . We call an n-bit string f' a trapdoor permutation if there exists some n-bit string such that the pair (f*, f') has a non-zero probability of being obtained when we run G on input I n .
It is important to note that not every n-bit string f * is a trapdoor permutation. In fact, the set of n-bit strings which are trapdoor permutations may be a very 444 sparse subset of (0, l}", and perhaps not even recognizabie in polynomial time.
If it is recognizable in polynomial time, we say the generator is certified (that is, the trapdoor permutation generator ( G , B, I ) is said to be certified if there exists a polynomial time algorithm which, on input a string f * , outputs 1 iff f* is a trapdoor permutation).
We note that certification is a lot to ask for. Consider our two main (conjectured) examples of trapdoor permutation generators: RSA [RSA] , and the factoring based generator of Blum, Blum and Shub [BBS] . Neither is !ikely to be certified. This is because, in both cases, certification would need the ability to recognize in polynomial time the class of integers which are a product of (exactly) two (distinct) primes. The importance of certification arises, as will see, from the use of trapdoor permutations as "tools" in protocols. Typically, one party (for example, the prover) gives the other party (for example, the verifier) a string f' which is supposed to be a trapdoor permutation. For security reasons he may not wish to reveal (as proof that it is indeed one) the string f*, but may nonetheless need to convince the verifier that f ' is indeed a trapdoor permutation. This is clearly easy if the underlying generator is certified. If the generator is not certified, the protocol itself must address the task of giving suitable conviction that f' is really a trapdoor permutation. In interactive protocols this is usually (but not necessarily always!) easy. As we will see, the issue is more complex in the non-interactive case.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
The setting we focus 0 1 1 in this paper is that of non-interactive zero-knowledge [BeGo] .
The model is as follows. The prover and verifier have a common input w and also share a random string (of length polynomial in the length of w). We call this string the reference string, and usually denote it by c. The prover must convince the verifier of the membership of w in some fixed underlying NP language L. To this end, the prover is allowed to send the verifier a single message, computed as a function of w and 0 (in the case where w E L , we also give the prover, as an auxiliary input, a witness to the membership of IJJ in L ) . We usually denote this message by p . The verifier (who is polynomial time) decides whether or not to accept as a function of w , u and p . We ask that there exist a prover who can convince the verifier to accept w E L , for all random strings 0 (this is the c o m p l e t e n e s s condition). We ask that for any prover, the probability (over the choice of c) that the verifier may be convinced to accept when w $ L is small (this is the soundness condition). Finally, we ask the the proof provided by the prover of the completeness condition (in the case w E I,) be zero-knowledge, by requiring the existence of an appropriate "simulator." For a more complete specification of what it means to be a NIZIC proof system, we refer the reader to $2.3.
We will focus here on protocols with efficient provers. That is, we want the prover of the completeness condition (we call it the "honest" prover) to run in polynomial (in n = lwl) time.
We note that we are considering what are called "single-theorem" or Ubounded" NIZK proof systems. The primitive of importance in applications is the "many-theorem" proof system (cf. [BFM, BDMP] ). However, the former is known to imply the latter, given the existence of one-way functions [Dek'u, FLS] . So we may, wlog, stick to the former. Feige, Lapidot and Sliamir [FLS] recently presented an elegant NIZK proof SYS- tern based on the existecce of trapdoor permutations. The assumption, implicit in their analysis, is i h a t the underlying trapdoor permutation generator is certified. Here we indicate whence arises the need for this certification. Once we have identified the source of the problem, we will discuss how we propose to solve it.
Let L be a language in NP, and let ( G , E , I ) be a trapdoor permutation generator. Fix a common input w E (0, l}n, and let denote the reference string. We will describe how the prover and verifier are instructed to operate under the FLS protocol. First, however, we need some background and some notation.
First, note that even if f' is not a hapdoor permutation, we may assume, wlog, that E ( f ' , z) is n-bits long. Thus, f* does specify (via E ) a map from (0, I}" to (0, I}" ; specifically, the map given by z ' t E ( f * , r ) . We call this map the function specified by f' under E , and wiil denote it by f . Of course, i f f ' is a trapdoor permutation then f is a permutation.
If z and r are n-bit strings then H ( z , r ) denotes the dot product, over GF(2j, of z and T (more precisely, H ( c ! r ) = z,~,). The theorem of Goldreich and Levin [GoL,e] says that H is a i'hard-core'l predicate for (G, E , I ) . Very informally, this means the following. Suppose we run G (on input 1") to get (f*, p), select 2 and T at random from {0, I}", and let y = f ( x ) . Then, given Y and 7 , the task of predicting H ( e , T ) , and the task of finding 2 , are equally hard.
w e are now ready to describe the protocol.
The protocol first asks that the prover P run G on input 1" to obtain a pair (f*, .?). P is then instructed to send f ' to V (while keeping And the problem is right here. in this first step. The analysis of [FLS] assumes that the prover performs this step correctly. This may he justified under the assumption that the trapdoor permutation generator is certified. If the generator is not certified, a cheaLing prover could, when w @ L , select, and send to the verifier, an n-bit string which is not a t,rapdoor permutation. As we will see, this could compromise the soundness of the protocol. Let us proceed.
to himself).
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Once the prover has supplied j', the reference string is regarded as a sequence = y l r l . . . yirl of d blocks of size 272, where 1 = I(n) is a (suitable) polynomial (block i consists of the pair of n bit strings y;yt). We say that the prover "opens block i with value b," if he provides the verifier with an n-bit string x, such that f(zi) = yt and H ( z i , T ; ) = b,. The prover now opens certain blocks of the random string (and the protocol specifies how an honest prover should choose which blocks to open). Based on the values of the opened blocks, their relative locations in the reference string, and the common input, the verifier decides whether or not to accept. Exactly how he does this is not relevant to our discussion. Exactly how the honest prover is supposed to decide which blocks to open (which he does as a function of the block, the common input, and his witness to the membership of the common input in L ) is also not relevant to our discussion. What is important t o note is that the soundness condition relies on the assumption that, with f' However, i f f * is not a trapdoor permutation, then f may not be a permutation, and in such a case, the possibility exists that blocks may be opened with values of the prover's choice.
We note that the gap is not an academic one. Considering concrete cases, such as the use of RSA or the trapdoor permutations based on quadratic residuosity that are suggested by [BBS] , we see that the prover may indeed cheat. The solution that first suggests itself is that the prover prove (in NIZK) that he really got f by running the generator G (this is an NP statement). The problem is, however, that to prove this new statement itself requires the use of a trapdoor permutation, arid we are only chasing our tail. We note that the whole problem would not arise if we were using a one-way permutation (rather than a trapdoor one) because, as we said above, a one-way permutation is a single object which both parties know a priori. Yet for the sake of maintaining the efficiency of the prover, we cannot use one-way permutations.
Remark. Note that in the above NIZK proof, a (cheating) prover may choose f' as a function of the random string. But, as pointed out in [FLS] , this causes no difficulties. We may assume, in the analysis, that the reference string is chosen after f' is fixed; Iater we apply a simple transformation which results in the proof system being secure even if j' was chosen as a function of 0. We will deal with this issue explicitly when it arises.
Our Solution
Let f * denote the n-bit string provided by the prover in the first step of the FLS protocol, as described above. As that discussion indicates, soundness does not really require that f be a trapdoor permutation. All that it requires is that f be a permutation. So it would suffice to certify this fact.
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To certify that a map from {01 1)" to (0, I}" is a permutation seems like a hard task (it is a coNP statement). What we will do is certify it is "almost" a permutation, and then show that this suffices.
More precisely, let us call f an c-permutation if at most an E fraction of the points in (0, l}" have more than one pre-image under f . We show that on common input f', and access to a common (random) reference string of length c -l . n, the prover can provide the verifier with a non-interactive, zeroknowledge proof that that f is an c-permutation. For a more precise statement of the theorem and its proof we refer the reader to '$3. We then show that adding this step to augment a multitude of independent FLS protocol instances yields a NIZK proof system (for any NP language) given the existence of any (not necessarily certified) trapdoor permutation generator.
A complete proof of this fact is in '$4. We note that this proof is in fact quite independent of the details of the FLS protocol and can be understood without a deep knowledge of the techniques of that paper.
Preliminaries
We begin by summarizing some basic notation and conventions which are used throughout the paper. We then discuss trapdoor permutations and say what it means for them to be "certified." Finally, we recall the definition, and some basic properties, of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems.
Notation and Conventions
We use the notation and conventions for probabilistic algorithms that originated
We emphasize the number of inputs received by an algorithm as follows. If algorithm A receives only one input we write " A ( . ) " ; if it receives two we write "A(-l a ) " , and so or,. If A is a probabilistic algorithm then, for any input i the notation A(i) refers to the probability space which to the string 0 assigns the probability that -4, on input i, outputs cr.
If S is a probability space we denote its support (the set of elements of positive probability) by [S] .
If f(.) and g ( -, . . .) are probabilistic algorithms then f ( g ( . , . . .)) is the probabilistic algorithm obtained by composing f and g (i.e. running f on g's output).
For any inputs z, y, . . . the associated probability space is denoted f ( g ( z , y, * . .)).
S denotes the algorithm which assigns t o z an element randomly selected according to S. In the case that [S] consists of only one element e we might also write z +-e.
If S is a probability space then 2 For probability spaces S, T I . . ., the notation denotes the probability that the predicate p(zl y, . . .) is true after the (ordered) execution of the algorithms z f S, y T , etc. denotes the probability space which to the string r7 assigns the probability When we say that a function is computable in polynomial time, we mean computable in time polynomial in the length of its first argument.
We will be interested in families of efficiently computable functions of polynomial description. The following definition will he a convenient way of capturing them. Definition 1. Let E ( . , .) be a polynomial time computable function. We say that E specifies an efficiently computable family o f functions if for each n > 0 and each f * , 2 E (0, 1)" it is the case that iE(f*, . ) I = n. Let n > 0 and f' E (0, l}n.
The function specified by f ' under E is the map from (0, 1)" to (0, lIn given by
2.2
Let US present a precise definition of = and E(f*,l(f*,y)) = y for all ",YE {O,l}n).
Security: For all probabilistic polynomial time (adversary) algorithms A ( , , ', .), for all constants c and sufficiently large n, it is the case that
is at most nn-c.
We call G, E , 1 the generating, evaluating and inverting algorithms, respectively.
The standard (conjectured) "trapdoor permutations," such as RSA [RSA] and the factoring based ones of Blum, Blum and Shub [BBS] , do fit this definition, after some minor transformations (the need for these transformations arises from 449 the fact that these number theoretic functions have domain 2; rather than (0, l}"; we refer the reader to [BeMi] for details).
If a trapdoor permutation generator ( G I El I ) is fixed and ( f * , f*) E [G(l")j for some n > 0, then, in informal discussion, we call f ' a trapdoor permutation.
It is important to note that not every n bit string f " is a trapdoor permutation: it is only one if there exists some ft such that (f*, f.) E [G(l")]. In fact, the set of ( n bit strings which are) trapdoor permutations may be a fairly sparse subset of (0, l}", and, in general, may not be recognizable in polynomial (in n) time. If a trapdoor permutation generator does have the special property that it is possible to recognize a trapdoor permutation in polynomial time then we say that this generator is Certified. The more formal definition follows.
Definition3. Let (GI E , I ) be a trapdoor permutation generator. We say that (GI E, I ) is certified if the language
We note that standard (conjectured) trapdoor permutation generators are (prohably) not certified. In particular, RSA is (probably) not certified, and nor is the trapdoor permutation generator of Blum, Blum and Shub [BBS] . This is because, in both these cases, the (description of) the trapdoor permutation f' includes a number which is a product of two primes, and there is (probably) no poiynomial time procedure to test whether or not a number is a product of two primes.
The importance of certification stems, as we have seen, from applications in which one party (for example, the prover) gives the other party (for example, the verifier) a string f ' which is supposed to be a trapdoor permutation. For security reasons he may not wish to reveal (as proof that it is indeed one) the string f*, but may nonetheless need to convince the verifier that f ' is indeed a trapdoor permutation. In particular, the (implicit) assumption in [FLS] is that the trapdoor permutation generator being used is certified. As the above indicates, this means that their scheme cannot be instantiated with RSA or the trapdoor permutations of [BBS] . In later sections we will show how to extend their scheme SO that any (not necessarily certified) trapdoor permutation generator suffices (so that RSA or the generator of [BBS] may in fact be used).
We note that if (G, E , I ) is a trapdoor permutation generator, f* E (0, l}", and IC E (0, l}" then we may assume, without loss of generality, that E(f*, s ) is a n n-bit string. Hence E ( f * , .) does specify some map from {O,l}" to (0, I}", even if f * is not a trapdoor permutation. That is, in the terminology of Definition 1, we may assume, without loss of generality, that the algorithm E specifies an efficiently computable family of functions. Of course, the map E ( f * , .) need not be a permutation on (0, l}".
Non-Interactive Zero-knowledge Proof Systems
We will consider non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for NP. It is helpful to begin with the following terminology.
Definition4. Let p ( . , .) be a binary relation. We say that p is an NP-relation if it is polynomial time computable and, moreover, there exists a polynomial p such that p ( w , G ) = 1 implies 5 p(lw1). For any w E {0, 1>* we let p ( w ) = { w E (0, l}' : p ( w , G ) 
Definition5. An ensemble indexed by L C (0, l}' is a collection { E ( W ) }~~L of probability spaces (of finite support), one for each w E L. Let t'l = { E~( w ) ) , E L and 82 = ( E Z ( W ) } ,~L be ensembles over a common index set L . We say that they are (corn putationally) indistinguishable if fcr every family { D w } w E~ of nonuniform, polynomial time algorithms, the function is negligible.
The definition that follows is based on that of Blum, De Santis, Micali and Persian0 [BDMP] . However, we state the zero-knowledge condition differently; specifically, we use the notion of a witness selector to state the zero-knowledge condition in terms of the standard notion of computational indistinguishability, whereas in [BDMP] the zero-knowledge condition makes explicit reference to "distinguishing" algorithms. The two formulations are, of course, equivalent (but we feel this one is a little simpler because of its "modularity.") Definition6. Let p be an NP-relation and let L = L,. Let P be a machine, V a polynomial time machine, and 5' a probabilistic, polynomial time machine. We say that ( P , V, S) defines a non-interactive zero-knowledge p r o o f system (NIZK proof system) for p if there exists a polynomial I ( . ) such that the following three conditions hold. 
We call P the prover, V the verifier and S the simulator. The polynomial 1 is the length of the reference string. We say that P is efficient if it is polynomial time computable.
We call CT the "common random string" or the "reference string."
The choice of 1/2 as the error-probability in the soundness condition is not essential. Given any polynomial k( .), the error-probability can be reduced to 2 -k ( n ) by running k(n) independent copies of the original proof system in parallel and accepting iff all suh-proofs are accepting.
A stronger definition (cf. [BDMP] ) asks that in the soundness condition the adversary P be allowed t o select a w $ L as a function of the reference string.
This definition is, however, implied by the one above. More precisely, given ( P , V, S) satisfying the above definition, one can construct (P', V', S') satisfying the more stringent definition, by a standard trick. Hence, we will stick t o the simple definition.
We note we are considering what have been called "single-theorem" or "bounded" NIZK proof systems. That is, the given reference string can be used to prove only a single theorem. The primitive of importance in applications (cf. [BeGo, NaYu] ) is the "many-theorem'' proof system. However, De Santis and Yung [DeYu] , and Feige, Lapidot and Shamir TFLS], have shown that the existence (for some NP-complete relatioc) of a bounded NIZK proof system with an efficient prover implies the existence (for any NP-relation) of a many-theorem NIZK proof system (with an efficient prover), as long as one-way functions exist. Hence, given that the (bounded) NIZK proof systems we construct do have efficient provers, we may, without loss of generality, stick to the bounded case. 
A NIZK Proof that a Map is Almost a Permutation
Suppose E specifies an efficiently computable family of functions (cf. Definition l ) , and suppose f" E {O, t}n for some n > 0. We address in this section the problem of providing a NIZK proof that the function specified by f* under E is "almost" a permutation.
We note that although this problem is motivated by the need to fill the gap in the FLS protocol (cf. §1.3), the results of this section might be of interest in their own right. Thus, we prefer to view them independently, and will make the link to [FLS] in the next section.
In addressing the task of providing a NIZK proof that the function specified by f' under E is "almost" a permutation, we must begin by clarifying two things. a n E fraction of the points in {0,1>" have more than one pre-image (under f ) .
More formally, we have the following.
Definition7. Let n > 0 and f :
We will now turn to the XSZK proof. The formal statement and proof of the theorem follow. Let 11s begin, however, by saying, informally, what we achieve, and giving the idea.
We fix E specifying an efficiently computable family of functions, and we fix a map E : iO,1>* -r (0, I]. We consider a prover and verifier who share a (random) reference string and have as common input a string f' E ( 0 , I}". If f (the function specified by f ' under E) is a permutation then the prover can convince the verifier to accept (this is the completeness condition). If f is not an e(n)-permutation, then the verifier will usually reject (this is the soundness condition). We note the gap between these two conditions: we are guaranteed nothing if f i s a n c(n)-permutation (but not a permutation). This is one way in which this "proof system" differs from proofs of language membership, where there are only two possibilities: either the input is in the language (and completeness applies) or it is not (and soundness applies).
In addition, when f is a permutation, the interaction yields no (extra) knowledge t o the verifier. This is formalized, as usual, by requiring the existence of an appropriate "simulator."
The idea is very simply stated. Let o be the reference string, which we think of as divided into blocks of size n. If f is not an c(n)-permutation, then each block has probability at most 1 -~( n ) of being in the range of f . So if we ask the prover to provide the inverse of f on ~-' ( n ) different blocks, then he can succeed with probability at most (1 -~( n ) )~ tn) -< 1/2. Moreover, a collection of pre-images of f on random points provide no information about (the easily computed) f , so the proof is zero-knowledge.
Theorem8. L e t E specify a n e f i c i e n t l y compztuble f a m i l y of functions. Let E : N -+ ( 0 , 11, and assume E-' is polynomiadly bounded and polynomial t i m e computable. T h e n there is a polynomial t i m e oracle machine A , a polynomial tame m a c h i n e B , and u probabilistic, polynomial t i m e machine M s u c h that the
following three conditions hold. Proof: We specify the algorithm for verifier. Let f* E (0, l}" and let (r = ul.. . D~-I (~) where each (T; has length n. Let f denote the function specified by f ' under E . On input f', cr, and a string p , the verifier B rejects if the length of p is not €-'in) . n. Otherwise! it partitions p into consecutive blocks of size n.
We denote the i-th block by p , , so that p = p , . . . p t -l ( q ) .
Then B accepts iff for each i = 1 , . . . , e -l ( n ) it is the case that f(p,) = cr,.
Next we specify the prover A . Let f* E (0, 1}" and let 0 = ol.. . g c -~( n ) where each c i has length n. Let f denote the function specified by f' under E , and suppose f is a permutation. On input f ' and u , and given f -l as oracle: A
It then sets p = p l . . . p E -l ( n ) and outputs p . It is easy to see that the completeness condition is true.
We now check the soundness condition. Let f ' E (0, and let f denote the function specified by f* under E . We recall that C(f) = {y E (0, l}" : lf-'(yji > 1 } is the collision set of f . Let D ( f ) = { y (0, I } " : I f-'(y)/ = 0 } be the set of n bit strings not in the range of f . Note that lD(f)i >_ iC(f)i. We let
and thus 6 ( n ) 2 ~( n ) .
For any fixed string
the following are clearly equivalent:
There exists a string p such that B ( f * ! (r, p) = 1 e -l ( n ) it is the case that (T, is in the range of f.
However, if u is chosen at random, then for each i = 1, . . . , c -l ( n ) , the probability that g i is in the range of f is at most 1 -6(n), independently for each it SO for any Fl
w e now specify M . Let f * E (0, l}" and let f denote the function specified by f' under E . Suppose f is a permutation. On input f', the machine picks T I , . . . , 7 ; -1 (~) E (0, I}" at random and
and outputs (r, p ) . The zero-knowledge is easy to check. I
We note that, in the above, we are thinking of f" as being the common input, and the reference string is chosen at random independently of f'. Of course, in our application, the prover may choose f* as a function of the reference string. This, however, is easily dealt with by a standard trick, and so, for the moment, we focus on the case presented here. When we put everything together (cf. Theorem 12) we will return to this issue and show explicitly how to deal with it, given what we establish here. We note also that no cryptographic assumptions were needed for the above proof, and the zero-knowledge is "perfect ."
Using t h e Certification Procedure
In this section we show how the certification procedure of Theorem 8 can be combined with the results of [FLS] to yield a NIZK proof system for any NPrelation. We stress that the argument we present here depends little on the specifics of the protocol of [FLS] , and our proof does not presume familiarity with that paper. We begin by extending Definition 7 with the following terminology.
Definition9. Let n > 0 and f : {O. l}" --+ (0, l}n. Let 0 = c1.. .q for some I E N, where each ut has length n. We say that r is f-bad if there is an i E {1, . . . , l } such that c? E C(f). We denote by Cl(,f) the set of all In-bit strings which are f-bad.
We now state without proof, a lemma which can be derived from [FLS] . The formal statement follows, but, since it is rather long, let us first try to give an informal explanation of what it says Briefly, we show how to "measure" the "additional" error incurred by the [FLS] protocol in the case that the function being used is not a permutation. More precisely, we fix a trapdoor permutation generator (G, E , I ) and a n NPrelation p. In order to make explicit the role played by the function used in the proof, we consider an interaction in which the common input is a pair ( w . f*)
of n-bit strings. The prover wishes to convince the verifier that w E L = L p , using f " as a ('tool." We do not, a priori, know whether or not f a is a trapdoor permutation.
The completeness condition (below) says that if w E L , then, assuming f'
really is a trapdoor permutation, the prover can convince the verifier that w E L .
Moreover, the zero-knowledge condition says this proof is zero-knowledge. The part we are really concerned with, however, is the soundness condition.
The soundness condition says that if w @ L then the probability that a prover can convince the verifier t o accept is bounded by a small error (1/4) plus a quantity that depends on f *. Specifically, this quantity is the probability that def 455 the reference string is f-bad (cf. Definition 9), where f is the function specified by f " under E .
A priori, this quantity may be large. 
where n = Iwl.
Soundness: For every machine FJ e v e r y w @ L , and every f '
where n = Iw/ and f denotes the function specified by f " under E .
Zero-knowledge: Let W be any watness selector for p . T h e n the following two ensembles are (computatzonally) zndistanguzshable:
(1) { ( a , f * , p ) :(f*,Pj E G ( l ' w ' ) ; ( u , P ) : M ( w , f * , p ' ) ) w~~
We note that the statement of the above lemma makes no explicit reference to the methods underlying the proof of [FLS] . Our previous discussions should indicate whence, in the light of the [FLS] protocol, arises the "extra" term in the soundness condition, but this is not relevant to the present discussion: everything we need is captured by the statement of the lemma (and we refer the reader to [FLS] for its proof).
We now show how to remove this extra f' dependent term in the soundness condition by having the prover certify (using the proof system of Theorem 8)
that f is almost a permutation. The lemma that follows provides the formal statement and proof, but let us first say, informally, what is happening.
On common input ( w , f*), we have the prover give the proof of Lemma 10, and also, using a separate part of the reference string, run the procedure of Theorem 8. The verifier accepts iff both of these proofs are accepted (by their respective verifiers). The completeness and zero-knowledge conditions stay the Same as in Lemma 10 (except that the reference string is longer, indicated by using a different symbol for its length); clearly, this is because the additional proof cannot hurt them. The soundness condition, however? now becomes more like a "real" soundness condition in that the "extra" term of Lemma 10 has disappeared.
In the proof of the new soundness condition, we will have to consider two cases. First, we assume that f is "almost" a permutation, and show that in this case the "extra" term from the soundness condition of Lemma 10 is small. Second, we assume that f is not ''almost'' a permutation, and use the fact that we are guaranteed rejection (with high probability) by the soundness condition of Theorem 8. 
Lemma 11. L e t ( G , E , I ) be
where n = jw(. (
Proof: Let A , B , M be the machines, and 1 the polynomial, specified by Lemma 10. Let E ( . ) = 1/(4l(*)). We apply Theorem 8 (with the algorithm E being the evaluating algorithm of our trapdoor family) to get a triplet of machines A, B , M satisfying the conditions of that theorem. We let m(.) = €-I(*) + I(*) =
51(*).
Nolalion: If u is a string of length m(n).n, then o [l] denotes the first e-l(n).n = 41(n) . n bits and c[2] denotes the last Z(n) . n bits.
We now specify the algorithm for the verifier B'. Let n. = Iw/ and let f' (0, I}" . Let f denote the function specified by f " under E . W e split the proof into two cases.
By the soundness condition of Lemma 10 it follows that for every machine P ,
The soundness condition follows from the definition of B ' . Let us pro next case.
Case 2: f is not a t(n)-permutation.
The soundness condition of Theorem 8 implies that for any function 0[1l) eed to the 9, 5 $ .
The soundness condition then follows directly from the definition of B'. This completes the proof of the soundness condition.
The zero-knowledge, again, follows immediately from Lemma 10 and Theorem 8. One more step is needed to derive from Lemma 11 the existence of NIZK proof systems for any NP-relation (given the existence of a trapdoor permutation generator). Namely, the interaction must be on input w (alone); the prover must be allowed to select f ' (which in Lemma 11 is part of the common input) not only as a function of w but also as a function of the reference string. Clearly, in the completeness condition, we may simply ask the prover to select f * by running the generation algorithm G. Any problems that arise will be in the soundness condition, where a cheating prover will take full advantage of the freedom to choose f ' as a function of the reference string.
For w 41 L , we may use the following "trick" (a standard probabilistic one, used, for the same purpose, in [BDMP] and [FLS] ). For each fixed f' E (0, l}", we reduce the probability that the verifier accepts the interaction on inputs (w, f*) to 2-(n+1), by parallel repetition. It follows that the probability that there exists a string f * E (0, l}" such that the verifier accepts on input (w, f * )
is at most 2" . 2-(n+1) = 1/2. Details are below.
Theorem 12. Let p be a n NP-relation. Suppose there exists a trapdoor permutat i o n generator. Then p possesses a non-interactzue zero-knowledge proof system with a n efficient prover.
Proof: Let (G, El I ) be a trapdoor permutation generator. Let A', B', M' be the machines, and m the polynomial, specified by Lemma 11. Let I(n) = m(n) .
n(n + 1). We construct P, V, S satisfying the conditions of Definition 6.
Notation: If u is a string of length I(n) then we think of it as partitioned into n+ 1 blocks, each of length m(n).n, and denote the i-th block by ~ [ i ] ( i = 1 , . . . , nS1).
We may assume, without loss of generality, that there is a polynomial t such that B'jw, ., . , p ) = 1 only if lp( = t(jw/). Let t = L,. We specify V . Let w E L and CT E (0, l}'(n). On input w, ~, p , machine V rejects if (pi # n + (n + l)t(n).
Otherwise, it sets f ' to the first n bits of p and p' t o the rest. It further sets p'[i] to the i-th t(n)-bit block of p' (i = 1 , . . . , n + 1). Now V accepts iff for each z = l , . . . , n + 1 i t i s t h e c a s e t h a t B ' ( w , a [ i ] , f " ,~' [ i ] ) = l .
We now specify P . Let w E L and G E p ( w ) . Let n = IwI, and let u E {0, l}'(" Next we check the soundness condition. Suppose w $ L. Let n = Jwl and let f ' E (0, l}". Let 0 E (0, l}'(n). We say that a is f*-bad if there exists an i E { 1, . . , , n -k l} and a string q E (0, l}t(n) such that B'(w, 44, f", q ) = 1. The soundness condition of Lemma 11 implies that 459 Now let us say that a string f * such that g is f*-bad. It follows that E (0, l}'(n) is bad if there exists an n-bit string This implies the soundness condition (as required by Definition 6 ) .
Finally, we specify the simulator. Let w t L and let n = IwI. On input w, the simulator S runs G on input 1" to obtain a (random) pair (f*,p) E [G(ln)]. For i = 1,. . ., n + 1 it runs M' on input P O , f * , f' to get an output (.-[i],p'[i] , p ) . The zero-knowledge (as required by Definition 6) can be argued based on the zero-knowledge condition of Lemma 11. We omit the details. I
In particular, NIZK proof systems are constructible based on RSA.
Combining Theorem 12 with the result of [NaYu] yields the following.
Corollary 13. S u p p o s e there exists a trapdoor p e r m u t a t i o n g e n e r a t o r . T h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a n e n c r y p t i o n s c h e m e secure a g a i n s t chosen-caphertext attack.
Similarly, combining Theorem 1 2 with the result of [BeGo] yields the following. [BeGo] .
Corollary 14. S u p p o s e there ezists a t r a p d o o r p e r m u t a t i o n g e n e r a t o r . T h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a n i m p Z e m e n t a t z o n of t h e s i g n a t u r e s c h e m e of

